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The Impact of Kolender v. Lawson on Law




The press dubbed him the Walkman. He was a tall, black, thirty-six
year-old San Francisco business consultant given to sporting dreadlocks
and unconventional clothes. He liked to walk whenever possible-espe-
cially in white neighborhoods late at night. While in San Diego on busi-
ness between 1975 and 1977, Edward Lawson was stopped fifteen times
by police.1 Pursuant to California Penal Code section 647(e),2 officers
told him to provide identification and account for his presence. Later,
the officers offered a variety of explanations for stopping Lawson that fell
far short of the reasonable cause requirement read into section 647(e) by
the courts.3 One officer thought that Lawson's behavior, which he de-
scribed as "dancing around," might lead to someone's injury.4 In an-
* B.A., 1968, Wagner College; J.D., 1974, New York University Law School. Adjunct
professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Loyola Law School. Portions
of this Article were submitted to the Supreme Court as an amicus brief in Kolender v. Lawson
on behalf of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Los Angeles, the National Law-
yers Guild, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the National
Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc.
** B.A., 1973, Yale University; J.D. candidate, 1985, University of California, Los Ange-
les Law School.
1. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 354 (1983).
2. Section 647(e) of the California Penal Code provided:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor: . . . (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to
place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to
account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the sur-
rounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public
safety demands such identification.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West Supp. 1984).
3. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1983); Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d
1362, 1364-65 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 95 (1974).
4. On February 29, 1976, Mr. Lawson was hitchhiking in a white area of San Diego. He
was the only black present. Trial record at 25, Lawson v. Kolender, No. 77-0213-N (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 21, 1979). Patrolling Officer Kinslow observed Lawson "dancing" along the street, so he
turned into a gas station and stopped to observe Lawson further. Id. at 245. Lawson was then
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other stop, the officer thought Lawson looked like someone "with his
hand caught in a cookie jar."5 In yet another stop, the officer testified
that a flat refusal to identify oneself "is common to people who are
wanted in other states, wanted locally, or who are mental cases.",6 Law-
son generally refused to provide the requested identification and was ar-
rested. In one case, he was arrested solely because he refused to provide
identification, not because an officer's suspicions that he had broken the
law prior to the stop proved justified-that never happened.7
On May 2, 1983, the United States Supreme Court declared section
647(e) unconstitutional.8 The majority took a very narrow approach:
detained and questioned. At trial, Officer Kinslow testified, "I thought if a pedestrian was to
walk by, possibly just by [Lawson's] actions or what I observed, that [he] could have assaulted
a pedestrian. I thought, by the way [Lawson was] dancing around, that [he was] capable of
moving into the street in front of a car, injuring [himself] or causing somebody else to be
injured." Id. at 257-58. Kinslow admitted that Lawson was "hitchhiking in a legal manner,"
and that he did not know of a law against dancing. Id. at 255-56. No criminal or even poten-
tial criminal activity was seen.
5. On May 27, 1976, San Diego Police Officer Moulton stopped Lawson. Moulton testi-
fied at trial that he had been on the lookout for a burglary suspect identified as a "tall, slender,
black male." Id. at 180. On cross examination the following colloquy took place:
Q. Was there anything in terms of what you observed the subject doing which led
you to believe that the subject was a prowler or the prowler in question, or the hot
prowler in question?
A. Let me see if I understand you correctly. Was he doing anything at that particu-
lar time?
Q. During any period of time that you observed him.
A. Just, other than the gesture of resolution when he saw me.
Q. The gesture of resolution. Could you explain that to me? I'm sorry; I don't
understand it.
A. Basically the look of someone who's caught with their hand in the cookie jar.
Q. Could you describe for the Court the standard that you are proposing, [what] the
"caught with your hands in the cookie jar look" basically is?
A. The shrugging of the shoulder, the mumbling to oneself.
Q. The shrugging of one's shoulders, the mumbling to oneself-you're indicating
that led you to believe that this individual might in fact be the hot prowler in
question?
A. It started me wondering, yes.
Id. at 186-87.
When asked whether he stopped each suspect who met the description, Moulton re-
sponded that he did not. Id. at 188. Before contacting Lawson, Moulton did not observe
Lawson "wandering" or "loitering." Id. at 191. A vague, unarticulable standard formed the
basis for the stop.
6. Id. at 340.
7. See infra note 70. The general rule is that an arrest must be based on probable cause
to believe criminal activity has taken place. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-99 (1983); Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 262-67 (5th ed. Supp.
1984). Pursuant to § 647(e) however, failure to provide identification was itself a crime that
could lead to arrest.
8. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Lawson, representing himself, brought a
civil action in federal district court seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that § 647(e) was un-
constitutional, (2) an injunction against its enforcement, and (3) damages from the officers who
the failure to specify what kind of identification a detainee must provide
rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague. 9 Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion addressed broader constitutional concerns. 10 He sug-
gested that the majority should have used the balancing test developed in
Terry v. Ohio.1" In Terry, the Court balanced the governmental interest
against the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights. The
result was a relaxation of the Fourth Amendment requirement that
search and seizure be based on probable cause. After Terry, an officer
can stop an individual for questioning if the officer has a reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
12
Justice Brennan applied the balancing test to the identification re-
quirement of section 647(e). He found that requiring an individual to
identify himself during a police stop did not further governmental inter-
ests. He therefore concluded that the Constitution prohibits arresting an
individual for refusing to identify himself.'3
No one, however, satisfactorily addressed the fundamental problem
with stop-and-identify statutes: they are traditionally used in an arbi-
trary manner against minority groups. Sociological studies conclude that
police officers enforcing stop-and-identify statutes allow racial prejudice
to influence their judgment. 14 While it is true that section 647(e) did not
provide guidelines for police conduct, revisions in the statutory language
will not remedy the problem of arbitrary enforcement until police officers
are retrained or restrained.
This Article argues that an application of the Terry balancing test
would completely nullify stop-and-identify statutes. Part I examines the
history of section 647(e). Part II analyzes sociological studies of police
detained him. The Southern District of California found the statute overbroad and issued the
injunction, but held that Lawson could not recover damages because the officers acted in good
faith. Lawson v. Kolender, No. 77-0213-N (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1979). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the statute was unconstitutional. Lawson v.
Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981). It held the statute unconstitutionally vague
and in violation of the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provisions. Id. at 1364-70. It
also reversed the district court's holding that Lawson was not entitled to a jury trial for deter-
mining whether the officers acted in good faith and remanded that issue for trial. The officers
appealed from the portion of the judgment that related to the injunction and the statute's
constitutionality.
9. 461 U.S. at 361.
10. Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring).
11. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
12. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
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practices during on-the-street stops. It examines the governmental inter-
est, if any, in demanding identification and contrasts this interest with
the concomitant intrusion on constitutional liberties. Part III examines
the constitutional issues raised by section 647(e). The Article concludes
that determining a suspect's identity during a street stop seldom ad-
vances a police investigation materially, nor turns reasonable suspicion to
stop into probable cause to arrest. On the other hand, the power to re-
quire identification upon pain of arrest invites abuse of discretion, dispro-
portionately directed at minorities.
I. The History of California's Stop-and-Identify Law
Had Edward Lawson taken his late night strolls before 1961, the
strolls themselves would have been a crime. Before section 647(e) was
amended, it was a crime to wander from place to place without lawful
business, to be unemployed, to beg, to loiter, or to take shelter on private
property without permission or in a "house of ill fame." Moreover, it
was a crime simply to be a prostitute, a drunkard, or an attorney's
capper. '5
In short, section 647(e) was a typical vagrancy statute, no better or
worse than similar statutes in other jurisdictions. Vagrancy statutes first
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) in its original form provided:
1. Every person (except a California Indian) without visible means of living who has
the physical ability to work, and who does not seek employment, nor labor when
employment is offered him; or,
2. Every beggar who solicits alms as a business; or,
3. Every person who roams about from place to place without any lawful business;
or,
4. Every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, or confidence operator,
either by his own confession, or by his having been convicted of any such offenses,
and having no visible or lawful means of support, when found loitering around any
steamboat landing, railroad depot, banking institution, broker's office, place of
amusement, auction room, store, shop or crowded thoroughfare, car or omnibus, or
any public gathering or assembly; or,
5. Every lewd or dissolute person, or every person who loiters in or about public
toilets in public parks; or,
6. Every person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night,
without any visible or lawful business; or,
7. Every person who lodges in any bar, shed, shop, outhouse, vessel, or place other
than such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the permission of the owner or
party entitled to the possession thereof; or,
8. Every person who lives in and about houses of ill-fame; or,
9. Every person who acts as a runner or capper for attorneys in and about police
courts or city prison; or,
10. Every common prostitute; or,
11. Every common drunkard; or,
12. Every person who loiters, prowls or wanders upon the private property of an-
other, in the nighttime, without visible or lawful business with the owner or occupant
thereof; . . . is a vagrant, and is punishable ....
1961 CAL. STAT., ch. 560, at 1672 (amended 1969).
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originated in England, during the decline of feudalism. No longer tied to
their lords, workers began to roam in search of better working condi-
tions. 6 The Statute of Laborers,17 enacted in 1349 and 1350, prohibited
such movement. In 1961, using language a fourteenth century court
would have found perfectly suited to its purposes, California still prohib-
ited roaming "from place to place without any lawful business."'"
In 1960, section 647(e) began to come under attack. The California
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a subsection of the act that
made being a "common drunkard" a crime. 9 With the rest of the stat-
ute's constitutionality in doubt, the California Legislature rewrote sec-
tion 647(e) in 1961. When section 647(e) emerged in its present form, it
was no longer technically a vagrancy statute but rather a disorderly con-
duct statute.20  Despite the efforts of the legislature, it was not clear
whether the new section 647(e) had succeeded in transforming a vague
"street-sweeping" 21 law into a modern disorderly conduct law.2 2
In the early 1970's the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality
16. [T]he peasant had begun to drift to the towns and it was unlikely that the old
village life in its unpleasant aspects should not be resented. . . . [I]n 1348 the Black
Death reached England and the vast mortality that ensued destroyed that reserve of
labour which alone had made the manorial system even nominally possible.
F. BRADSHAW, A Social History of England, quoted in Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of
the Law of Vagrancy, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 67, 69 (1964).
17. S. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 503 (quoting Statutes of Laborers, 23 Edw. 3, c.1 (1349)
and 25 Edw. 3, c.1 (1350)).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (3) (West 1960). Later English vagrancy laws controlled
"wild rogues" and the "notorious brotherhood of beggars." S. GIFIs, supra note 17, at 503.
California's vagrancy law, as late as 1872, singled out for punishment armed persons "com-
monly known as 'Greasers' or the issue of Spanish and Indian blood." 1855 CAL. STAT., ch.
175, at 217, amended by 1863 CAL. STAT., ch. 525, at 770, quoted in Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues,
and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 557, 562 (1960).
Although no longer known by the same name in 20th century California, "wild rogues" were
clearly of concern to the drafters of the pre-1961 version of § 647(e). Judging from the stat-
ute's prohibitions, "wild rogues" generally could be found loitering at public toilets, at houses
of ill fame, and-when in the employ of attorneys-at police courts and prisons. See supra note
15.
19. In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364(1960) (subdivision 11).
20. Statutory language to the contrary, both the Ninth Circuit and the press continued, 20
years later, to refer to § 647(e) as a vagrancy statute. E.g., Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d
1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1981); State Vagrancy Law Voided as Overly Vague, Los Angeles Times,
May 3, 1983, at 1, col. 3. See supra note 2.
21. "[Ihe laws are now used principally as a mechanism for 'clearing the streets' of the
derelicts who inhabit the 'skid roads' and 'Bowerys' of our large urban areas." Chambliss,
supra note 16, at 75 (quoting Foote, Vagrancy Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 603, 613 (1956)).
22. For a complete analysis of vagrancy statutes prior to Lawson, see Keenan, California
Penal Code § 647(e): A Constitutional Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 285
(1980).
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of laws proscribing loitering. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,2"the
Court found unconstitutionally vague a statute that prohibited loitering
in the streets. In Palmer v. City of Euclid,24 the Court struck down a
similar statute that added a second element, failing to account for one-
self, on the grounds that the statute was too susceptible to arbitrary
enforcement. In Lawson, the issue was whether a third element, requir-
ing an individual to identify himself under circumstances that indicate to
a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification,
cured the constitutional defects.25 Prior to Lawson, a California court of
appeal held that further constraints on police interrogation would render
the statute constitutionally acceptable if they comported with the stan-
dard described in Terry v. Ohio.26
Pursuant to Terry an officer who has reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion that criminal activity is afoot may stop a suspect for questioning.
27
The officer may arrest the suspect only if the questioning elicits addi-
tional evidence that raises his reasonable suspicion to probable cause.28
The identification provision in section 647(e) effectively lowered the stan-
dard for an arrest. It allowed the officer, after making the Terry stop, to
demand identification from the suspect. If the identification was not sat-
isfactory, the officer could arrest on these grounds. The officer could not
arrest the suspect for the underlying crime because the initial stop was
based only on reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Under section
647(e) reasonable suspicion plus failure to provide identification became,
23. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
24. 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
25. A number of lower courts already invalidated criminal statutes similar to California
Penal Code § 647(e). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d
Cir. 1974), affd on other grounds sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Hall
v. United States, 459 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 262
N.W.2d 921 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d
567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); City of Portland v.
White, 9 Or. App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972); City of Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d 539, 536
P.2d 603 (1975) (en banc); State v. Starks, 51 Wis. 2d 256, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971); but see
State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
Other jurisdictions have limited provisions in statutes that require suspects to account for
their presence, and prohibit lack of compliance from constituting a specific element of an of-
fense. See, e.g., United States v. McClough, 263 A.2d 48 (D.C. 1970); State v. Zito, 54 N.J.
206, 254 A.2d 769 (1969).
26. People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 95 (1974).
27. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82
(1975) (reasonable suspicion warrants temporary seizure for questioning limited to purpose of
stop).
28. 392 U.S. at 26.
without any additional evidence of criminal activity, probable cause to
arrest.
As a result of the lower standard for arrest under section 647(e), the
potential for intrusion on individual constitutional liberties increases.
However, in Terry the Supreme Court stated that an intrusion upon
Fourth Amendment rights is justified only when the governmental inter-
est involved outweighs the constitutionally protected right.29 Accord-
ingly, to properly evaluate the identification requirement of section
647(e) it is necessary to determine what governmental interest is ad-
vanced by requiring identification during a Terry stop and to what extent
granting police such power intrudes on constitutional freedoms.
II. Stop-and-Identify Statutes: What Happens on the Street
The Supreme Court in Lawson held section 647(e) unconstitutional
because it did not define with sufficient precision what kind of identifica-
tion a detainee must provide. The Court pointed out that leaving the
decision "to the moment-to-moment judgment of a police officer on the
beat"30 leads to "harsh and discriminatory enforcement. . . against par-
ticular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."'3' It gives police "vir-
tually unrestrained power."3
Other questions of vagueness, however, were not considered by the
majority opinion. Under section 647(e), the detainee need not produce
identification unless attending circumstances indicate the public safety
necessitates such disclosure.33 The exigencies of public safety frequently
are not overt, and are engendered solely by the reasonable suspicions of
patrolling officers. But a detainee has no way of knowing whether the
officer has reasonable suspicion. Nor can he predict whether a court
would find that the reasonable suspicion was justified. Thus, the detainee
cannot know whether the law actually requires him to produce identifica-
tion in a particular situation.
Harsh and discriminatory enforcement is the principal problem with
stop-and-identify statutes. Even if police were free of all vice and preju-
dice, the statutes leave too much to police discretion. Officers base their
decisons on "reasonable suspicion." What guidance they get from their
29. Id. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
30. 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black,
J., concurring)).
31. 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)).
32. 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
33. See supra note 2.
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departments in interpreting this phrase, and how well departments con-
trol the behavior of their officers in conducting street stops merit
discussion.
A. Guidance
Police departments rarely issue formal guidelines to their officers for
determining when "reasonable suspicion" exists.34 This lack of guidance
by police departments means that a statute such as section 647(e) cannot
be enforced uniformly. Police manuals often do not mention reasonable
suspicion,35 although they may refer to "suspicious persons" without de-
fining the term.3 6 Accompanying discussion may imply that the officer is
to use common sense gained through field experience.37 When police
manuals do attempt to define reasonable suspicion, they do so with vary-
ing degrees of generality.38 If manuals address factors to be considered
in stopping and interrogating, they do not specify the significance of each
factor.39
Examining manuals of several police departments indicates that of-
ficers are to formulate their own individual procedures.' The decision to
stop a person on the street "rests on the officer's subjective (sometimes
intuitive) conclusion that the appearance, demeanor, or activities of the
potential subject are not normal for the particular time, place and cir-
cumstances under which they are observed."'" A recent study of four
34. W. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUs-
TOMS, AND MORALITY 155-60 (1970).
35. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING
AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 38.43
(1967).
36. Id. at 38.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 38-40.
39. Id. at 40.
40. NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, SCHOOL OF POLICE
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY
RELATIONS 329 (1967).
41. J. BOYDSTON, SAN DIEGO FIELD INTERROGATION FINAL REPORT 7 (1975). Circum-
stances involving Mr. Lawson illustrate the lack of standards. In one instance, a police officer
looking for a felony suspect described as a "white male that had one leg" instructed Mr. Law-
son and a black business associate to leave their restaurant table and step outside. Lawson and
his associate were the only black persons in the restaurant. The officer testified that he felt the
need to contact some people and determine if anybody had ever seen anyone matching the
description. Lawson was not released until he had identified himself to the satisfaction of the
officer. Trial Record at 15-16, Lawson v. Kolender, No. 77-0213-N (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1979).
On another occasion, January 24, 1977, Mr. Lawson was stopped while walking in the
vicinity of the University of San Diego at about 1:00 A.M. Although the detaining officer
testified that it was not illegal for pedestrians to be on the road at that time, that Lawson was
neither "wandering" nor "loitering," and that Lawson had done nothing to lead the officer to
Southern California communities found that police administrators and
field supervisors have little influence or actual control over field officers'
routine decisions.42
The lack of a manual presents an additional problem. Absent writ-
ten guidelines, new recruits are likely to give more weight to what they
learn from experienced officers in the field than to formal training.4 3 As
the Westley study pointed out, those experienced officers will disparage
playing by the book.' Other literature corroborates these findings:
Field training is rarely formal, often poorly conceptualized and
usually pitifully meager. So-called field training experiences are
very short and trainees are given little if any opportunity to reflect
believe that he was preparing to commit a crime, had committeed a crime, or was committing
a crime, she stopped him. Id. at 272-74.' She explained the basis for the stop as follows: "My
legal authority was 647(e) under certain circumstances, and [Lawson] fell within those certain
circumstances. I said that [Lawson was] not committing a crime, to the best of my knowledge.
I had not observed any activity that made me think [he was] going to commit a crime. How-
ever, I felt the safety of the citizens in that area was at stake enough to talk to someone who
was unusual in the area at that hour, walking in the area. It's a high crime area. That [made]
it legal for me to stop [him] and at least find out who [he was] even though [he had] not
committed a crime, and I don't think [he was] about to commit a crime. [Lawson] may have
committed a crime without my knowledge and without any indication on my part of even
knowing whether [he] had or not at that time." Id. at 275-76. Upon providing identification,
Lawson was released.
On March 22, 1976, Lawson was stopped by Officer Sanchez. The stop took place in the
middle of the day in Lawson's neighborhood. Officer Sanchez claimed to have stopped Law-
son because he was "walking on the paved portion of the roadway, approximately five or four
feet from the shoulder of the road, which constituted a hazard to public safety and to his
safety." Id. at 165. Officer Sanchez acknowledged that there were no sidewalks in the area.
Id. at 177. Sanchez also testified that the term "wandering" did not enter his head as the
reason for the stop, nor did he think that Lawson was "loitering." Id. at 170-71. Nevertheless,
Sanchez stopped Lawson and demanded that he identify himself because of the "hazard to the
public safety." Id. at 171. Upon providing identification, Lawson was released.
Concerning still another stop, when asked to describe the meaning of 647(e), the officer
testified as follows: "Essentially, any person wandering about with no apparent reason, no
apparent cause . . . is required by 647(e) to identify himself to a peace officer and also to
explain his reasons why he is there." Id. at 138. According to the officer, the first thing he did
when he made contact with the individual was to ask for identification. "I asked him specifi-
cally who he was, where he was coming from, and specifically where he lived and where he was
going." Id. at 119. Lawson refused to answer these questions, was arrested, and went to jail.
These stops demonstrate neither a common understanding by police officers of the standard
required to demand identification under § 647(e), nor uniform enforcement of the statute.
42. M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREETS, POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMA OF
REFORM 96-131 (1981); cf. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 35, at
87-89.
43. De facto training often consists of permitting new recruits to make the rounds with
experienced officers. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY OF THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 304-306 (1978).
44. W. WESTLEY, supra note 34, at 154-59. See A. BRENT, THE POLITICS OF LAW 36
(1974).
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on, discuss, and understand their experience.45
Peer pressure and custom teach rookie officers that minorities are
treated differently.46 This conditioning may account for studies showing
that racial prejudice dramatically increases as a result of time spent on
the police force.47 Numerous studies indicate that factors such as race,
sex, age, general appearance, demeanor, and social class routinely influ-
ence an officer's decision to make a stop or an arrest.48 Of these charac-
teristics, officers most often perceive race as the salient factor in
establishing reasonable suspicion.49
45. Wasserman & Couper, Training and Education, in POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINIsTRA-
TION 129 (1974).
46. W. WESTLEY, supra note 34, at 160-65.
47. As a result of this prejudice, for example, the use of racial epithets by police in street
contacts is widespread and "in most cases the language is chosen deliberately to demean the
citizen and demonstrate the superiority of the officer." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 180-
82 (1967) (quoting N. GOLDMAN, THE DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION OF JUVENILE OFFENSES
FOR COURT APPEARANCES 106 (1963)). See also Ford, Meeker & Zeller, Police, Students, and
Racial Hostilities, 3 J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 9 (1975); Reese, Police Academy Training and Its
Effects on Racial Prejudice, I J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 257 (1973); Teahan, A Longitudinal Study
of Attitude Shifts Among Black and White Police Officers, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 47 (1975).
48. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 35, at 18-43. See also L.
RADELET, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY 158-61 (2d ed. 1977); R. TROJANOWICZ & S.
DIXON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE COMMUNITY 80-82 (1974); Bogomolny, Street Patrol:
The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 544, 567-74 (1976); Lundman, Police Mis-
conduct, in POLICE BEHAVIOR: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 169-71 (1980); Reed & Reed,
Status, Images and Consequences: Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal, in IMAGES OF CRIME:
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS 123 (T. Thornberry & E. Sagarin eds.1974).
49. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 166. Three instances involving Lawson illustrate this
factor. In the first instance, he was walking in a business district. A murder suspect had been
described to an officer as a black male. When asked at trial what distinguished Lawson from
the people whom he did not elect to stop, the officer replied: "Apparently-all the facts adding
up to (sic) I had never seen him before. He was walking in an area uncommon for blacks to be
walking at that hour, in a closed business district, and in fact matched the description .... "
Trial Record at 160, Lawson v. Kolender, No. 77-0231-N (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1979). Lawson
provided identification after being stopped and questioned.
In another stop an officer had been told that a tall, long-haired male negro was "loitering"
in the area of a public school. Lawson was seen about "half a block" from the school. Id. at
195-96. He was stopped and released only when he provided identification. The officer testi-
fied at trial that Mr. Lawson was not loitering, wandering or engaged in any crime-he was
only walking. Id. at 197-200. The officer justified stopping Lawson because he was the only
tall, male negro he had seen that day. Id. at 201. In this case, a complaint by an unnamed
person resulted in Lawson's detention and may have resulted in his conviction for a crime if he
did not have sufficient identification or had chosen not to identify himself.
In the third example, the officer who stopped Lawson testified that he did so because the
police were seeking a suspect for a crime. He stated that "the only information the police
department had on it was that it was a black male and no other description." Id. at 306.
When identification was demanded, Lawson complied and was released.
Perhaps one reason police officers use stereotypes is that the modem
patrol car approach to law enforcement cuts them off from the commu-
nity. Modem patrolmen "do not so much involve themselves with peo-
ple as they observe from a distance."50  In addition, an officer's
operational style,5 moods, prejudices, past experience (or lack of experi-
ence),52 interfere with accurate observation and often make community
contact arbitrary and fragmented.
Lack of administrative control over individual officer behavior
means that, in practice, a statute such as section 647(e) can provide a
conscious or unconscious tool for harassment and discrimination. 3 The
Supreme Court failed to address this problem in Lawson.
B. The Impact on Minority Communities
Arbitrary enforcement of stop-and-identify statutes affects minority
communities disproportionately. 4 In the name of crime prevention,
many departments have adopted a "show the flag" policy, essentially
maintaining a visible presence in the community.5 The purpose is not
necessarily to respond to calls but to detect and prevent crime via aggres-
sive investigation-stopping, questioning, frisking, and searching.
5 6
50. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 21.
51. The operational style of a police officer has a tremendous impact on the exercise of
discretion to stop an individual for field interrogation. See J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 16-56
(1968).
52. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at chs. 6, 7, 8.
53. However, even police manuals and training programs cannot be expected to establish
meaningful standards for the enforcement of stop-and-identify laws when the laws themselves
offer no guidance.
54. A recent study by the Rand Corporation found that although blacks comprise only
12% of the U.S. population, they comprise 48% of the prison population. Courts in California,
Michigan and Texas typically impose longer sentences on Hispanics and blacks than on whites
convicted of comparable felonies with similar criminal records. Not only do these minorities
receive longer minimum sentences from the court, but once imprisoned they often serve a
greater proportion of their original sentences than their white counterparts. After a misde-
meanor conviction, white defendants receive probation rather than jail sentences more often
than their minority counterparts. J. PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 32, 63-68 (1983).
55. Officers are under substantial pressure from their superiors to conduct aggressive pa-
trols. J. RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 43-48 (1973); see M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 138-41.
56. Burkoff, Non-Investigatory Police Encounters, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 681, 692-
93 (citing L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 35, at 16) ("Few police
administrators or patrol officers view stop-and-frisks as narrowly limited to investigatory func-
tions. The assumption, in fact, has long been directly to the contrary."); see generally EFFEC-
TIVE POLICE ADMINISTRATION 402, 418 (H. More ed. 1975); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 183 (1968); A. RIaESS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 90-94 (1971);
Bogomolny, supra note 48, at 552; Kuykendall, Styles of Community Policing, 12 CRIMINOL-
OGY 229, 234 (1974); Larson, Crime Prevention on Patrol, POLICE CHIEF, June 1976, at 56;
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They are there "to create an atmosphere of police omnipresence which
will dissuade persons from attempting to commit crimes because of the
likelihood of their being detected and apprehended."57 They believe that,
when the situation calls for it, a competent police officer must act brus-
quely or use aggressive-possibly illegal-tactics. 8
Aggressive patrol tactics have their greatest impact in the minority
community, where police officers have a well-documented tendency to
base their behavior on negative stereotypes. Studies show, for example,
that police officers perceive blacks as more likely to engage in criminal
activity or to be armed and dangerous. 9 When minorities are found
outside minority neighborhoods, race may become the principal basis for
an officer's suspicion.6"
In neighborhoods where police are showing the flag, Terry stops
most often involve minorities. A 1973 police study shows that black
males are far more likely to be stopped and interrogated than one would
expect from their arrest records.' It follows that they are more likely to
be arrested for refusing to identify themselves in circumstances that justi-
Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DEN. L.J.
389, 395-98 (1966); Note, Orders to Move on and the Prevention of Crime, 87 YALE L.J. 603,
604 (1978); Note, Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City Police Practices, 9 UTAH L. REV. 593,
610-16 (1965).
A survey by Michael K. Brown revealed that a majority of patrol officers believe an ag-
gressive police presence deters crime. Over 80% believed that the need for such presence
justified rigorous stop-and-question tactics in some neighborhoods, even though the tactics
might exceed the letter of the law. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 163-69. See id. at 164-65
table 6.3.
57. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 23 (1967). See also A. BRISTOW, FIELD INTERRO-
GATION 5 (2d ed. 1964).
58. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 163-69.
59. Id. at 170-77; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 80-87 (1967); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 96-104
(1968); Werthman & Piliavin, Gang Members and the Police, in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGI-
CAL STUDIES (D. Bordua ed. 1967).
60. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 166; J. SKOLNICK, supra note 59, at 86-87; AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 Comment (b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1975).
Statistics, along with their own experience, often convince officers that minorities are
predisposed to crime. These beliefs may, in turn, distort the statistics. Since concentrating on
the activities of a particular group may lead to biased estimates of the propensity of that group
to commit crimes, "non-whites are more likely than whites to be arrested under circumstances
that will not constitute sufficient grounds for prosecution." Bogomolny, supra note 48, at 571-
72, table 2.
61. Inn, Report on Two Police Practices: High-Speed Chase and Field Interrogation 14
(unpublished study, Center for Police Development, Southern Methodist Univ. School of Law,
1973) (the center was directed by Robert L. Bogomolny; the source is quoted in Bogomolny,
supra note 48, at 571-72, table 2).
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fled neither the stop nor the interrogation in the first place. A federal
district court in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.6" found: "Negroes are
arrested substantially more frequently than whites in proportion to their
numbers. The evidence on this question was overwhelming and utterly
convincing. For example, negroes nationally compose some eleven per-
cent of the population and account for twenty-seven percent of reported
arrests and forty-five percent of arrests reported as 'suspicion arrests.' ,63
Police also tend to discriminate against those who do not defer to
their authority."4 Objects of harassment tend to lose respect for the po-
lice officers. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders states: " 'Harassment' or discourtesy may not be the result of
malicious or discriminatory intent of police officers. Many officers sim-
ply fail to understand the effects of their actions because of their limited
knowledge of the Negro community . ,.65 In their own eyes, officers
stop no one except for good cause.6 6 They expect detainees to recognize
that they have been detained for good reason and to defer politely to
authority.6 7 However, based on their prejudices, police officers are more
likely to stop minorities, and minorities are less likely to respond with
deference because of their hostility toward police. An officer will view
lack of cooperation as an indication of guilt, thereby justifying an
arrest.68 Thus, failure to cooperate with the police greatly increases the
odds of getting arrested.69
Section 647(e) gave police a handy tool for making such an arrest.70
62. 316 F. Supp. 401 (1970), affid and modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).
63. 316 F. Supp. at 405. See also Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminatory
Employment Criterion, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165 (1970) (analysis of Gregory).
64. See generally M. SKIES, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1975); J. SKOLNICK,
supra note 59, at 80-83; Burkoff, supra note 56, at 706-77 (citing L. RADELET, supra note 48);
Rafky, Police Race Attitudes and Labeling, 1 J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 65 (1973). See also Sup-
PLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968); Rafky, Thibault, & Lynch, Are Cops Prejudiced?, 40 POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 1973, at 60;
Swan, The Politics of Identfication: A Perspective of Police Accountability, 20 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 119 (1974).
65. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 159
(1968).
66. M. BROWN, supra note 42, at 196-98.
67. Id. at 198.
68. Id.; L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 35, at 59-60.
69. Black, The Production of Crime Rates, 1970 AM. Soc. REV. 733, discussed in J.
PETERSILIA, supra note 54, at 43. See also Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles,
1964 AM. J. Soc. 206. As Jerome Skolnick notes, "If an honest citizen resides in a neighbor-
hood heavily populated by criminals, just as the chances are high that he might be one, so too
are the chances high that he might be mistaken for one." J. SKOLNICK, supra note 59, at 218.
70. As an illustration, one of Lawson's arresting officers testified at trial that he thought
Lawson's refusal to answer questions proved he was guilty of something. Trial Record at 340,
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It legitimized arbitrary and unproductive relations between the police
and minority communities. A detainee's refusal to provide identification
during a Terry stop elevated reasonable suspicion, on which the stop was
based, to probable cause for arrest. That the arrest might later be invali-
dated did not reduce the inconvenience or stigma.
C. The Effectiveness of Section 647(e)
Section 647(e) and similar statutes did not lead to large-scale appre-
hension of criminals. According to one study, 5,998 stop-and-identify
encounters turned up only 78 criminal acts-60 traffic violations and 18
infractions that were, most likely, minor.71 In another study, 11,244 en-
counters produced only 1,488 criminal suspects. Of those, police
searched twenty percent, but only one out of every four of the searches
turned up evidence of crime.72 Furthermore, field interrogations were
found to have had "no significant impact either on the level of crime or
the public's feeling of security.
73
Lawson v. Kolender, No. 77-0213-N (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1979). In another instance, a San
Diego police officer stopped Lawson as he walked on a residential street carrying a legal pad.
The officer observed Lawson for 15 to 30 seconds, judged him to be soliciting door-to-door, but
did not see a solicitor's permit. Id. at 286-89, 291. The officer grabbed Lawson's arm when he
ignored questions and attempted to walk away. Id. at 289. On another occasion, Lawson was
stopped by Officer Caplenor. Officer Caplenor stated that he had been patrolling an area
where a number of car burglaries had occurred. He assumed that they had taken place in the
late evening or early morning hours. He saw Lawson at approximately 4:00 a.m. Id. at 211.
Caplenor testified as follows:
Q. Was there anything in the fifteen seconds in which you observed the subject that
the subject did which would lead you to believe that the subject had just committed a
crime?
A. No.
Q. Was there anything that the subject did during the fifteen seconds that you ob-
served the subject which would lead you to believe that the subject was in the process
of committing a crime?
A. Other than being in the particular area that he was, and the time that he was
there, no.
Id. at 229-30.
Caplenor stopped Lawson, demanded his identification, and upon Lawson's refusal to
provide such information, arrested him. Upon first observing Lawson, Caplenor stated that
there was nothing unusual about his appearance. Id. at 208. It was only after approaching
him that Caplenor noticed that Lawson's pants were torn and that he was "wet from the hips
down." Id. at 208-09. The condition of Lawson's clothes were claimed by the officer to be the
basis for the stop although the record clearly indicates that the officer had decided to stop him
before he noticed that condition.
71. Bogomolny, supra note 48, at 567, 571-77.
72. 2 STUDIES OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS,
§ 1 (1967), cited in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 275 n.37.
73. Bogomolny, supra note 48, at 550; Tytell, Citizens, Patrol Commanders, and the Kan-
sas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, POLICE CHIEF, Nov. 1975, at 42.
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While section 647(e) stops did not significantly aid the police, they
created much hostility in the community.74
Extensive and detailed empirical studies revealed great hostility re-
sulting from the widespread use of field interrogations in San Di-
ego. In that city, approximately 200,000 such field interrogations
are reported annually for a city of about 600,000 people. Although
it is not clear what proportion of these would be considered stops
in the terms of this Code, many of these encounters were perceived
to be peremptory and coercive.75
These empirical studies demonstrate that section 647(e) fails the Terry
test since it does not promote a legitimate governmental interest. In ad-
dition, the intrusion on individual liberties, especially those of minorities,
is great.
III. Constitutional Issues and the Supreme Court Opinion
The press hailed Kolender v. Lawson as a victory for Lawson.7 6 Jus-
tice O'Connor's majority opinion struck down section 647(e) as unconsti-
tutional. While the majority spoke sternly about "arbitrary
enforcement," it decided the case on a very narrow ground. The statute
was too vague in describing what kind of identification the detainee must
produce. The majority buried its real message in footnote ten:
Because we affirm the judgment of the court below on this ground,
we find it unnecessary to decide the other questions raised by the
parties because our resolution of these other issues would decide
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of doing so (ci-
tations omitted). The remaining issues raised by the parties in-
clude whether section 647(e) implicates Fourth Amendment
concerns, whether the individual has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his identity when he is detained lawfully under Terry,
whether the requirement that an individual identify himself during
a Terry stop violates the Fifth Amendment protection against com-
pelled testimony, and whether inclusion of the Terry standard as
part of a criminal justice statute creates other vagueness problems.
The appellee also argues that section 647(e) permits arrests on less
74. R. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 183, 184, 187, 231-42 (1977). Black males and peo-
ple under the age of 21 are far more likely to be stopped and interrogated than comparable
arrest or population statistics should allow. Bogomolny, supra note 48, at 567-73. Further,
"[m]isuse of field interrogations. . . is causing serious friction with minority groups in many
localities." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 57, at 184. See
also J. PETERSILIA, supra note 54, at xxx ("our findings do not discount the charge that the
police arrest minorities on weaker evidence").
75. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 274.
76. See, e.g., State Vagrancy Law Voided as Overly Vague, Los Angeles Times, May 3,
1983, at 1, col. 3.
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than probable cause.77
The majority's holding, while valid, failed to reach other important
constitutional issues. There is no doubt that the statute vested too much
authority in the detaining officer who, at his own discretion, could decide
whether or not a detainee provided adequate information under section
647(e).78 Too much discretion, the Court noted, leads to arbitrary en-
forcement.79 The detainee did not know what kind of identification he
must produce and thus did not know when he was breaking the law.
Section 647(e) did not present especially novel constitutional ques-
tions. The Court was being asked to clarify what it meant in Terry, given
that California courts had construed a section 647(e) stop as equivalent
to a Terry stop.80 It was unclear whether Terry represented a one-time
exception to the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement or
whether it opened the door to widespread use of a balancing test when-
ever the government argues that its own interests outweigh individual
freedoms. Section 647(e) did present more than one constitutional ques-
tion, but the tension created by its enforcement in minority communities
suggests that the Court should have ruled on each question.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, stated that Terry repre-
sented a limit beyond which he was unwilling to go. He noted that the
Court had agreed with him in the past:
Where probable cause is lacking, we have expressly declined to al-
low significantly more intrusive detentions or searches on the Terry
rationale, despite the assertion of compelling law enforcement in-
terests. . . . We have never claimed that expansion of the power
of police officers to act on reasonable suspicion alone, or even less,
would further no law enforcement interests. . . But the balance
struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public interest in
effective law enforcement and the equally public interest in safe-
guarding individual freedom and privacy from arbitrary govern-
mental interference forbids such expansion.8"
77. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 361 n.10.
78. Id.
79. Section 647(e), as presently drafted and construed by California courts, contains no
standard for determining how a suspect can satisfy the requirement to provide "credible and
reliable" identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of
the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute. An individual, whom
police find suspicious but lack probable cause to arrest, may walk the public steets "only at the
whim of any police officer" who happens to stop that individual under § 647(e). Lawson, 461
U.S. at 358 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
80. People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973).
81. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 363, 365 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also noted:
[T]he statute at issue in this case could not be constitutional unless the intrusions on
Fourth Amendment rights it occasions were necessary to advance some specific, le-
gitimate state interest not already taken into account by the constitutional analysis
[Vol. 12:105
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Put another way, Justice Brennan's legal conclusion confirmed the soci-
ological conclusion: the government interest advanced by section 647(e)
does not outweigh the intrusion on individual liberties.
Section 647(e) distorted Terry by making reasonable suspicion not
only grounds for a stop and frisk but also grounds for arrest. After a
stop and frisk, a subject is free to go, unless the search produces probable
cause.82 After a stop and a refusal to provide identification, however, the
subject may be arrested and convicted under section 647(e).
83
The majority noted the dangers of arbitrary enforcement of section
647(e), but only Justice Brennan considered the additional dangers posed
when an officer has at his disposal not only the power to stop and frisk on
less than probable cause but also the power to arrest.84 A stop and frisk,
however unpleasant, represents no more than a temporary intrusion on
privacy. Although California courts have implied that a demand for
identification represents less of an intrusion on privacy than a frisk,85 the
Ninth Circuit's Lawson opinion disagreed: "[P]olice knowledge of the
identity of an individual they have deemed 'suspicious' grants the police
unfettered discretion to initiate or continue an investigation of that per-
son long after the detention has ended.",86 Arrest and conviction intrude
even more significantly.
8 7
described above. Yet appellants do not claim that § 647(e) advances any interest
other than general facilitation of police investigation and preservation of public or-
der. . . .Nor do appellants show that the power to arrest and to impose a criminal
sanction, in addition to the power to detain and to pose questions under the aegis of
state authority, is so necessary in pursuit of the State's legitimate interests as to jus-
tify the substantial additional intrusion on individuals' rights.
Id. at 367. The empirical studies discussed in part II further explain why the weak govern-
mental interest does not outweigh intrusions on individuals' rights. See supra notes 30-75 and
accompanying text.
82. Police may briefly detain the subject against his will during the search by means of
physical force or a "show of authority," but cannot compel him to answer questions or use his
refusal as a basis for arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). Anything beyond
these limitations requires probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
83. Of course, where an individual refuses or is unable to produce proof of identity, prob-
able cause to arrest under § 647(e) exists. But, as the Ninth Circuit held:
[A]s a result of the demand for identification, [the statute] bootstraps the authority to
arrest on less than probable cause .... It authorizes arrest and conviction for con-
duct that is no more than suspicious. A legislature could not reduce the standard for
arrest from probable cause to suspicion; and it may not accomplish the same result
by making suspicious conduct a substantive offense."
Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Powell v. Stone, 507
F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)).
84. 461 U.S. at 367-68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
86. Lawson, 658 F.2d at 1368.
87. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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Failure to produce identification was a crime under section 647(e)
only if an individual was wandering the streets "without apparent reason
or business" and "if the surrounding circumstances [were] such as to
indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demand[ed] such
identification. '18  A person who set out to violate section 647(e) could
easily satisfy the first element by wandering around without apparent
business, but fulfilling the second element would prove more difficult.
First, section 647(e) does not specify the type of identification that would
be sufficient. Whether an unofficial identification would satisfy the stat-
ute is left to the officer's discretion. Second, if the potential lawbreaker
refused to provide any identification, he could not know whether the sur-
rounding circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that the
public safety demanded his identification. He could not read the officer's
mind. He lacks the officer's training, experience, and prejudices. He
would not know what crime has been reported in that neighborhood in
the past hour or what suspects matching his description were at large.89
The potential lawbreaker could not possibly know whether an officer pos-
sessed "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity." 90 Nor would the potential law-
breaker know whether a court would agree with the officer. Reasonable
persons, including members of the Supreme Court reviewing the same
record, can and do differ as to when reasonable suspicion exists.9 Thus,
section 647(e) provides inadequate notice of what kind of identification a
detainee must produce, and when he must produce it.
To sum up, section 647(e) presented classic vagueness problems: (1)
it failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable opportunity
to know what was prohibited so that he could act accordingly 92 and (2) it
88. See supra note 2.
89. See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (suspicion based on drug courier
profile); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563-65 (1980) (suspicion based in part on
DEA profile); State v. Ochoa, 111 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1976) (profile for detection
of stolen vehicles transported to Mexico).
90. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). In California, an officer may
consider a suspicious explanation of behavior in choosing to make a stop even though there is
also an innocent explanation. Thus, an individual can arouse suspicion by innocent conduct
that merely appears suspicious. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 894, 582 P.2d 957, 960, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 366, 369 (1978).
91. Compare majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois 444 U.S. 85
(1979) (majority opinion at 92-93, and dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J., at 106, differing as
to existence of "reasonable belief or suspicion" that person to be frisked was "armed and
dangerous").
92. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
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"impermissibly [delegated] . . . basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."93 On
the street, the constitutional subtleties vanished and only the practical
reality remained: as long as the officer believed he was acting correctly,
the detainee was best advised to produce identification-provided he had
the foresight to bring it along-or face the prospect of being arrested.94
Footnote ten allowed the majority to bypass several constitutional
issues.95 For instance, when an officer makes a Terry stop in a jurisdic-
tion that has no section 647(e), he may not compel the detainee to pro-
duce identification without probable cause. But section 647(e)
authorized the officer to make the same kind of stop and, on the basis of
reasonable suspicion alone, threaten to arrest the the detainee for failure
to produce identification. Simply by enacting a statute, the California
Legislature raised reasonable suspicion to the level of probable cause. As
Justice Brennan noted, "California cannot abridge this constitutional
rule by making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions during a
Terry encounter, any more than it could abridge the protections of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments by making it a crime to refuse to answer
police questions once a suspect has been taken into custody."
9 6
Stop-and-identify laws implicate other Fourth Amendment rights,
such as the right to mobility.97 If black males with long braids believe
they will be subject to Lawson stops for strolling through white neighbor-
hoods after hours, they may choose to stay closer to home. In addition,
such laws implicate Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination
and the right to "a private enclave where [an individual] may lead a pri-
93. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168-69. See also City of Mes-
quite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 290 n.12 (1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 390 (1979).
94. The pedestrian will know that to assert his rights may subject him to arrest and
all that goes with it: new acquaintances among jailers, lawyers, prisoners, and
bailbondsmen, first-hand knowledge of local jail conditions, a "search incident to
arrest," and the expense of defending against a possible prosecution. The only re-
sponse to be expected is compliance with the officers' requests, whether or not they
are based on reasonable suspicion, and without regard to the possibility of later vindi-
cation in court. Mere reasonable suspicion does not justify subjecting the innocent to
such a dilemma.
Lawson, 461 U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
95. The majority opinion did note First Amendment and freedom of movement concerns,
but only in passing and only in regard to the identification requirement. 461 U.S. at 358.
96. 461 U.S. at 366-67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (a constitutional right to travel exists "as
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads").
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vate life."98 Section 647(e), in effect, compelled a detainee to extract
from his private enclave a coherent explanation of his activities, keeping
in mind that "breathing the cool night air" was unlikely to placate an
officer who thought he had just caught a burglar.
One of the more lyrical Supreme Court opinions in recent memory
quoted Walt Whitman, Henry Thoreau, and Vachel Lindsay on the vir-
tues of strolling from place to place without any lawful purpose:
These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving
our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feel-
ing of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dis-
sent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right
to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits
rather than hushed, suffocating silence.99
In Whitman's vision of America, one who had done nothing wrong ex-
cept failing to produce identification could reasonably claim what Justice
Brandeis called "the right to be let alone."'" While section 647(e) was in
effect, the black, the poor, the unconventional, and the unwanted found
that, in the same situation, color or status became reasonable suspicion to
stop them on the street and arrest them.
Conclusion
Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[t]he security of one's pri-
vacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."'' ° This Article has cited
numerous studies indicating that stop-and-identify statutes often provide
a pretext for arbitrary treatment of minorities. The studies also suggest
that such statutes do little to aid in crime prevention but much to create
fear and hostility in minority communities. Should the California Legis-
lature attempt to revive section 647(e), it must address not only the
Supreme Court's narrow concerns but the social realities as well. A new
statute must specify what kind of identification a detainee needs, and
meet the Terry balancing test by showing that the governmental interest
in such a stop outweighs the intrusion on privacy. Justice Brennan ar-
gued that section 647(e) failed to make such a showing. Our discussion
98. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416
(1966) (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (1956) (Frank, J.,
dissenting)).
99. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
100. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men").
101. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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indicates why there cannot be such a showing. No mere rewording will
change the essential balance and make the slight governmental interest in
requiring identification during a Terry stop outweigh the intrusion on
individual freedoms. Now that the Supreme Court has overturned sec-
tion 647(e), California would do well to let it rest in peace.

